Bioprospection is, largely, meant to help reducing deforestation and, the other way around, stopping deforestation enhances the prospects of bioprospection. The need for a global agreement to the problem of tropical deforestation has led to the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) scheme, which proposes that developed countries pay developing countries for CO 2 emissions saved 10 through avoided deforestation and degradation. The remaining issue at stake is to dene the rules dening payments to countries reducing their deforestation rate.
Introduction
It is demonstrated that carbon emissions from deforestation could represent up to 20% of anthropogenic carbon emissions (IPCC, 2007) . It is also argued that climate change miti- The underlying logic of this scheme is simple: it proposes that developing countries be 35 paid for carbon emissions saved through avoided deforestation, either by a system of carbon credits, tradable on carbon markets, or by an international fund, nanced mostly by contributions from developed countries. Since then, the policy debate of the last three years has essentially focused on the way such transfer scheme should be designed. The most popular option is to compensate developing countries proportionally to the dierence 40 between their observed rate of deforestation and a given reference rate, with a per-unit compensation aligned on the market price of carbon. Therefore, one of the key issues of the negotiations is the denition of reference levels since they will both determine the payments received by each country and the size of the total North-South transfer. It has triggered hot debates amongst developing countries themselves and no consensus has been 45 reached so far.
However, despite this uncertainty, the principle of such scheme was ocially endorsed to ensure the success of the REDD scheme? We argue in this paper that the way the REDD scheme is being negotiated and set-up may induce serious design aws, which are very likely to make it ineective. The main reason is that the negotiation over reference levels may lead to perverse incentives. An ineective REDD scheme could also lead to 60 the acceleration of terrestrial biodiversity loss. A better-designed transfer scheme could be envisaged which could also attract other types of contributors such as bioprospection rms. They would then pay to preserve forested prospection areas.
Our present work develops a game theoretic model of the way international negotiations on REDD are unfolding. This model helps to analyze whether the REDD scheme, as it is negotiated today, can really lead to a successful outcome, or whether it might end up with no gain in avoided deforestation, and the absence of any further nancial contributions by developed countries. The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short historical perspective on international negotiations on deforestation and summarizes the main contributions of economic theory to the debate. Section 3 describes a simple 70 framework where the North-South dimension of the deforestation negotiation dilemma can be captured. It uses this framework to investigate the logic of the REDD compensation scheme and to simulate the outcomes of current negotiations over the REDD scheme design. We show that the negotiated mechanism can be eective only for a specic level of contributions by developed countries: under this threshold, it has no impact of defor-75 estation. Above this threshold, any additional funding is counter-productive because it increases deforestation! The fourth section concludes on the welfare properties of such mechanism. Overall, the present analysis shows that the REDD scheme should be designed dierently if eectiveness is to be garanteed.
2 Conicts at stake in the REDD negotiation 80 Developed countries have long been aware of the alarming rate at which deforestation is taking place in tropical countries and of the irreversible losses associated with the destruction of the primary forest. However, although several attempts were made to establish a multilateral convention on forest protection, in the last 25 years, developing countries have been reluctant to make commitments which could jeopardize their rights 85 to exploit their forestry resources without compensations from the rest of the world.
The 1992 Rio summit failed to launch an eective forest convention. Since then, the only outcome of international negotiations on forests has been the adoption of non-legally binding principles concerning sustainable forest management and trade of tropical timber
.
The failure to reach a global agreement has been however partially compensated by 90 other types of initiatives, mainly driven by biodiversity conservation concerns: there are a few examples of bilateral agreements in which a donor country nances the protection of a specic forest area in a host country; the Convention on biological diversity (CBD) has also promoted a protected area policy, nanced through the Global Environment Facility 2 (GEF). In both cases, it is a project-based approach, based on the principle 95 of additionality, in which donor countries only pay for incremental costs of protection in a given area of a host country: they are willing to compensate the operational costs of conservation, as well as a proportion of foregone revenues from land uses other than conservation, for the forest protection measures that would not have been undertaken The main innovation of REDD is to shift away from a logic of cost compensation 110 towards a logic of purchase of CO 2 storage service. Until then, all transfers were inputbased payments, nancing implementation costs of forest conservation in host countries.
The REDD transfers are output-based payments: they are allocated per unit of real reduction of deforestation rate, compared to a reference level or baseline. The ojective is thus to encourage host countries to reduce their deforestation rate below the agreed 115 reference level. Formally, the transfer T received by the host country is calculated as 1 For more details on Forest principles see http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-3annex3.htm 2 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is a global partnership reuniting 178 countries, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and private rms. It helps to nance sustainable development initiatives in the eld of global environmental issues. It is also the designated nancial mechanism for some multilateral environmental agreements and framework conventions. 3 See http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/ The hurdle in this international negotiation is quite unusual. In the vast theoretical literature on international environmental agreements, few papers focus on the transfer schemes between developed countries wishing to conserve natural resources with global public benets, and developing countries which have sovereignty over these resources.
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Developed countries (or donor countries) have to decide on their individual contributions to the multilateral fund, whereas developing countries (host countries) decide on their participation in the scheme and on the relative eort provided by each in the total conservation eort. The division between developed countries and developing countries of the net surplus generated by the cooperation is also at stake. Barrett (1994) focuses on 175 the free-rider problem in the contribution game to a global biodiversity conservation fund by developed countries. He shows that when a self-enforcing full cooperative agreement is attainable, then the net benets are small compared to the non cooperative outcome.
5 Advocates of the forest transition phenomenon argue that high rates of deforestation are only transitory and should decline in time. Rudel et al. (2005) assume two paths to explain the forest transition: the economic development path, economic opportunities and non-farm jobs lead to the abandonment of less productive arable land which can revert into forest, and the scarcity path, the decrease in forest cover fosters landowners and forest compagnies to replenish the forest. This should be taken into account in the revision of the baseline to avoid unnecessary monetary compensations. is the total forest area of country i. 
Property 1 indicates that beyond a given deforestation threshold d i , the marginal utility of additional deforestation is zero because the remaining forested area is unsuitable for the 220 development of farming and logging activities, due to geographical reasons (remoteness from roads and markets), bio-physical reasons (nature of soils, slopes, climatic conditions) or economic reasons (the net protability of deforestation becomes negative).
In the rest of the paper, and without loss of generality, we will limit the analysis to the case when the marginal utility of deforestation is not changed by the level of wealth:
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Assumption 1
Although such an assumption is not easily testable, we assume that Southern countries 
t is the transfer rate. It reects the value of avoided deforestation in terms of reduced emissions of carbon 7 . The budget of the global transfer fund must balance. Therefore, if the sum of the Northern countries' contributions to the fund is e then:
Under the laissez-faire scenario, in the absence of the REDD mechanism, there are In the rest of the paper, we will assume usual Inada conditions to avoid corner decisions
7 It was suggested in a number of arena that t could be measured as follows: t = CD * 3.66 * P C where CD is the carbon density of preserved forests (tonC/Ha), 3.66 is the atomic ratio of carbon dioxyde to carbon (tonCO 2 /C) and P C is the price of an emission permit for one ton of CO2, on existing carbon markets. Assumption 4
Under 
Southern countries bargain amongst themselves over their respective baselines know-
ing the size of the global transfer fund e and the per unit "price" for avoided defor-265 estation t . Northern countries do not take part directly in this negotiation. They nevertheless retain strong bargaining power since they can decide to withdraw their nancial contributions to e if the decisions made by Southern countries do not suit them. Therefore the South, as a whole, is confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it oer.
3. Once the rules upon the baselines are set, Southern countries independently choose 270 their deforestation rates by maximizing their utility. We assume in this formal model that countries can control the deforestation rate. The reality is more complex since deforestation is the outcome of decentralized actions by many private agents who are not easily controlled and monitored by public authorities. However, since the REDD mechanism implicitly assumes that the state can inforce its decisions on 275 deforestation agents, we adopt the same set of assumptions.
The model is solved by backward induction. An example using a logarithmic utility is provided in the rst appendix.
8 USA, Japan, Australia, France, Norway and the UK. 
From the rst order conditions of the utility maximization problem, using the implicit 285 function theorem one can calculate:
Under Assumption 1, we have:
Given assumptions 3 , we can infer from Equation (7) that:
This result indicates that country i s deforestation increases, but less than proportionally, with the baseline level d b i that is negotiated in the second stage.
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Remark 5 From (5) and using the implicit function theorem:
The sign of this expression is surprisingly ambiguous: intuitively, we expect that a higher compensation rate per unit of avoided deforestation t reduces the optimal deforestation decision d * i . However, this is only the case if t ≤
, Southern countries will not need to reduce further their deforestation to receive a higher payment.
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This shows that the choice of t is crucial in the eectiveness of the scheme. 
Bargaining over the baselines in the South
In the second period, Southern countries anticipate the third period decisions described above and have been informed about the size of the global fund e from Northern countries
We assume that Southern countries bargain between themselves on the value of their 300 respective baselines, knowing that they cannot collectively claim more than e and that they have no interest to claim less than e. Whatever the bargaining procedure, they will
b * 2 which satises the following budget constraint:
Hence, the outcome of the bargaining
must belong to the following feasible set:
The bargaining over the baseline can be conceptualized in several ways. We use here the Nash bargaining solution concept.
Let's dene each country's indirect utility functions as follows:
If Southern countries fail to reach an agreement, there will be no North-South trans-310 fers and Southern countries will choose their maximum deforestation rate d i Indirect utilities will be:
Assuming that the bargained outcome is given by the Nash solution d
b * 2 , and that
represent the utilities at the threat points for country 1 and country 2, then
where Ω represents the feasible set of baseline decisions given by (10); 1 and , are the respective bargaining powers of country 1 and 2; and 1 + 2 = 1. The endogenous
b * 2 solve the rst-order conditions given by:
for i, j = 1, 2, i = j. 
3.3
Choice of global transfer e by the North 320 A necessary condition for the North to accept to contribute to the global fund e is that nancial transfers be eective and induce a reduction in total deforestation. Let's therefore evaluate the marginal impact of a greater contribution by the North to the global fund e on optimal deforestation decisions by Southern countries, at the optimal deforestation
We know already from result (8) that
is positive and strictly inferior to 1.
In appendix 2, we demonstrate that
Proposition Starting from a level of transfer that sustains an interior optimum for deforestation decisions, the greater the size of the global transfer fund e, the greater the agreed baselines and the larger the deforestation rates. This leaves room for an increase of deforestation, provided it is not too large compared to 340 the increment of the baseline, in order to get a strictly positive transfer T i . Expression (13) along with (8) shows that this is the case because 0 < there is a pernicious eect that stems from the endogenous adjustment of the baselines.
As regards nancial contributions to the global transfer fund, the North therefore has incentives to downsize them in order to limit the temptation by developing countries to 345 negotiate higher baselines. From the above proposition, this will reduce the baselines and the optimal deforestation decisions in the South. The utility levels attained in the South at the negotiated baselines will also be reduced. Therefore, there may exist a specic level of contributions e * , the corresponding baselines d
2 ), such that for any lower size of the global transfer fund, developing countries 350 will prefer to give up transfers and will choose their maximal deforestation rates. These specic baselines are those that just meet Condition 4; they equalize the utility level at an interior solution with the utility level at the upper corner (see Figures 2 and 3 ). They are dened as the solution to:
With those threshold baselines d 
What the analysis of the present paper reveals is that the North should not contribute more e * , since this will increase deforestation and cost more at the same time. Should it provide a smaller transfer fund than e * , given that deforestation levels in the South would then rocket to their maximum levels? The answer depends on the comparison of 360 the North's utility levels achieved at e = e * and e = 0. 
In practice, identifying the threshold e * is no simple matter, in particular because it depends on utility parameters which are not readily observable. Dierently stated, the mechanism is either ineective, or it implies a waste of resources, except at e * .
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Welfare properties of the REDD mechanism
Although the REDD mechanism is primarily designed to reduce deforestation, it is interesting to analyze its properties in terms of global welfare. Since there is no supranational authority to enforce the mechanism, it only relies on voluntary participation. Therefore, when the mechanism is eective, i.e. when e * * = e * , the utility levels of both Northern and Southern countries are at least the same as in the laissez-faire situation and REDD is Pareto improving.
A more ambitious goal for REDD would be to achieve Pareto optimality, while improving welfare for each country. Pareto optimal deforestation decisions d 
where (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ) ∈ 3 + are respectively the weights of countries 1, 2 and 3 in the global welfare function, γ 1 + γ 2 + γ 3 = 1, and m i is the nancial endowment of country i after the transfer: m 1 = w 1 + T 1 , m 2 = w 2 + T 2 and m 3 = w 3 − e.
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The rst-order conditions of this maximization problem are:
This set of four equations imposes that the Pareto-optimal solutions (d
and m P O 3 ) solve the following conditions:
Recall that non cooperative decisions are given by equation (5):
Therefore, comparing (15) and (5) Pareto optimality of the Nash equilibrium requires also that the rate of transfer t solves:
The Pareto optimality of the REDD mechanism is therefore a fragile property, because 395 it imposes that the rate of transfer t be calculated on the basis of countries'preferences and weights in the global welfare function, whereas it is in reality planned to be calculated on the basis of the market price of carbon, which itself depends on the number of emission permits that will be delivered under the post-Kyoto agreement. The probability that the market value of t coincides with its Pareto-optimal value is very small. The scenario under 400 which a perfectly-informed supranational authority would impose such value is even less plausible.
Conclusion
This stylised model challenges the generally accepted idea that the REDD program is a step in the right direction to curb deforestation. Whereas most studies focus on spe-405 cic implementation issues, such as additionality, leakage and links to poverty-alleviation projects (for a review, see Angelsen, 2009 ), this paper shows that the basic principles of the scheme -a payment in return for avoided deforestation -are very likely to be ill-designed and to lead to inecient outcomes. This is due to the nature of current international negotiations over the denition of REDD allocation rules: we show that a transfer 410 mechanism in which the size of the global transfer is chosen before rules are dened for the baseline can generate perverse incentives. This stems from the fact that it creates incentives for developing countries to negotiate greater baselines, therefore allowing them to minimize their eorts of avoided deforestation in exchange of positive transfers. The mechanism leads to a waste of money when the sum of contributions by Northern countries 415 is higher than a given threshold (let's call it the eective fund size) and it is unecient to curb deforestation when it is below this level. This result is independent of the structure of preferences of negotiating parties and of their relative bargaining power. Moreover, even if donor countries were able to identify the eective fund sizes, there is no guarantee that the resulting income redistribution and reduced deforestation would lead to a 420 Pareto-optimum, since it would also impose to choose a specic value for unit transfers, reecting the structure of countries'preferences.
Two practical recommandations can be drawn from this theoretical model. The rst one is that if the negotiation process unfolds as previously discussed, the international community should give itself the means to reach the eective fund size without falling 
